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BENEFITS, REGULATORY OBSTACLES,
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EDWARD J. PARK'
1. INTRODUCTION
The United States has experienced remarkable growth in the
securitization' of financial assets by pooling assets and creating
secondary markets for so-called asset-backed securities ("ABS").'
At the end of 1992, the total value of securitized assets exceeded
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1991,
Amherst College. I would like to thank my wife Peige for her support.
' Securitization may be defined broadly as the repackaging of illiquid assets
and their associated cash flows into marketable securities. On securitization
generally, see TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING,
INANCIAL ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (1991) (a compre-
hensive treatise on the history, legal issues, theories, and structures of
securitization); SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (fason H.P. Kravitt ed.,
1991) (a practitioner's guide) [hereinafter Kravitt]; Joseph C. Shenker &
Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New
Frontiers, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1369 (1991) (setting forth the background and basic
principles of asset securitization, as well as recent legal and regulatory
developments in the field). Frankel discusses two other forms of securitization:
commercial paper (the substitution of securities for loans) and loan participa-
tions (the sale of portions of large loans). See FRANKEL, supra, SS 2.2-2.3. This
Comment focuses on securitization by pooling, rather than by commercialpaper or loan participation, because pooling has a larger potential market in
Japan and more relevance to te Japanese capital market and banks. See David
G. Littet al., Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entrj into
Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 369, 379-83 (1990). Also, commercial paper and loan participation
transactions a mre muc moe developed in Japan. See, eg., Hidek Kanda &
Michael Kawachi, Securitization in Japan, JCR FIN. DIG., Nov. 1993, at 1; Litt
et al., supra, at 423-28. For varying definitions of securitization, see Shenker
& Colletta, sura, at 1373-75; Robert B. Titus, Asset Securitization: Marvel of the
Marketplace, Iut Shoould We Be Uneasy?, 73 B.U. L. REv. 271, 272-73 (1993)(book review).
2 Asset-backed securities are the end products of the securitization process
and are sold to and traded among investors, usually of the institutional variety.
Each ABS is based on a pool of assets, the cash flows of which pass through to
the ABS.
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an estimated one trillion dollars.3 Securitization has provided
borrowers with lower interest rates, investors with greater
liquidity, banks with lower funding costs, and the economy with
a lower cost of capital.4
In Japan, however, the ABS market is heavily restricted and
regulated. In particular, regulation has prevented Japanese banks
from restructuring their nonperforming loans' and effectively has
hindered Japanese companies seeking an alternative source of
capital. Also, restrictions on trading have proved troublesome for
non-Japanese issuers of ABS seeking access to the Japanese capital
market.6
In light of continuing developments in Japan, this Comment
focuses on the theories underlying securitization and the potential
application of these theories to Japan's highly regulated financial
industry. This Comment argues that a more fully developed ABS
market is necessary both for the future profitability of the
Japanese banking industry and for effective financing for Japanese
nonbank companies, and that such a market requires nothing less
than significant reform of securities and banking regulation.
Section 2 outlines the basic principles and benefits of securiti-
zation and discusses the potential for an ABS market in Japan.
Section 3 provides a brief overview of the historical development
of asset securitization in Japan and describes some sample
transactions. Section 4 examines and analyzes Japanese securities
and banking regulations, the major obstacles to a fully developed
ABS market, as well as other impediments. Section 5 briefly
discusses some theories for reform and deregulation that might
promote the market for ABS in Japan. Section 6 concludes that
gradual yet significant reform of financial regulation is necessary
for the future growth of securitization in Japan. This growth, in
turn, should benefit the well-being of Japanese banks and their
3 See Michael T. Kawachi, The New Law of Asset Securitization in Japan, 17
U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 587, 590 (1994)
4 See discussion infra section 2.2.
s See Poor-performing Loans, Low Demand Stifle Money Flow, Economic
Revival: Financial Sector ills Graver than Bank Ledgers Indicate, NIKKEI WKLY.,
Nov. 28, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Poor-performing Loans].
6 In recent U.S.-Japan trade talks regarding the financial services industry,
the United States urged Japan to open up a domestic ABS market to allow U.S.
ABS issuers access to the Japanese securities markets. See Treasury Seeking Early
Resolution in Japan Financial Services Talks, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) 48 (Jan. 2,
1995) [hereinafter Treasury Seeking Early Resolution].
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corporate clients.
2. OVERVIEW OF SECURITIZATION
2.1. Development in the United States and Europe
The securitization of financial assets originated in the U.S.
residential mortgage industry as a financing tool developed by the
Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA"), the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association ("GNMA"), and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC").' Since the
1970s, these federal agencies have bought qualifying home
mortgages from lenders, pooled the mortgages, issued securities
(each of which is backed by a mortgage pool), resold the securities
in the capital markets, and provided guarantees of the timely
payment of interest and principal on the securities.8 The market
for these so-called mortgage-backed securities ("MBS") currently
remains the largest for securitized assets both in the United States
and in the world, totalling over 900 billion dollars.9 The MBS
market has substantially integrated the U.S. real estate credit
markets with national and international capital markets,"
including the Japanese capital market.11
Moreover, the securitization of mortgages has served as a
model for the securitization of a variety of other financial assets
by both the government and the private sector. Government
sponsored pools include student loans, through the Student Loan
Marketing Association, and farm loans, through Farm Credit
Banks.12 The private sector has securitized assets such as automo-
bile loans, home equity loans, leases, credit card and trade
receivables, and loans made or held by the U.S. federal govern-
7 See, e.g., Michael H. Schill, Uniformity orDiversity: Residential Real Estate
Finance Law in the 1990s and the Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64
S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1267-71 (1991). FNMA, GNMA, and FHILMC are all
quasi-governmental agencies designed to increase the availability of funding for
purchases of residential real estate in the United States. See id.; see also Shenker
& Colletta, supra note 1, at 1380-88 (providing a history of quasi-securitization
transactions before the emergence of mortgage-backed securities).
' See Schill, supra note 7, at 1268-70.
9 See FRANKEL, supra note 1, S 2.4.5.
10 See Schill, supra note 7, at 1270.
"' Certain MBS have a significant presence in Japan. See infra notes 86-87
and accompanying text.
1 See FRANKEL, supra note 1, S 2.4.3.
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ment. 3 Both the amount and variety of securitized loans have
increased dramatically.
14
The general process of asset securitization follows the pooling
method of the MBS model, whereby one or more intermediaries
between the borrowers and the ABS investors, such as banks,
repackage the assets, usually loans, into securities that are
issued.'5  Meanwhile, the government (the original lender),
banks, or insurance companies provide the "credit enhancement,"
which lowers the risks to investors through guarantees or
collateral. 6 Market intermediaries develop secondary markets
for the securities through issuance and trading.17 Only through
this intermediation process, including both pooling and credit
enhancement, can a secondary market be created for ABS.
Technological advances in computer data processing also have
enabled the growth of asset securitization by facilitating the
evaluation of loans, interstate lending, trading, and the creation of
new ABS.'8 Moreover, telecommunication technologies have
integrated the world's financial markets by allowing "trading
virtually without borders." 9  Globalization of the capital
markets has spawned the issuance and trading of ABS between
countries, especially in European markets.' It also has made
securitization easier in countries such as Japan."'
Overseas placement of ABS backed by U.S. assets has been
widespread. In contrast, securitization of domestic assets has been
developed and completed in Canada and in almost all of the
European Union nations, though all are on a much smaller scale
13 See id. S 1.3, 2.4.4.
14 See id. S 1.3.
15 See id. S 1.2, 2.5.1.
16 Id.
17 See id.
" See Yoichi Miyazawa, Financial System Reform in Japan: Separation of
Banking and Securities Business, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1991
233, 240-41, (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 743,
1991); Schill, supra note 7, at 1271; Kazuhito Ikeo, Banks Failing to Take
Advantage of New Business Opportunities: Outdated Accounting Practices,
Reluctance to Change Cloud Diversification Prospects, NIKKEI WKLY., Oct. 31,
1994, at 7.
19 Miyazawa, supra note 18, at 241.
20 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1422.
21 See Litt et al., supra note 1, at 374.
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than in the United States.22
Growth outside of the United States has been slow due to the
relative lack of experience with secured transactions, the compli-
cated nature of securitization, and the restrictive regulatory
environments.2 Nonetheless, foreign asset securitizations are
expected to grow in number and in size as banks begin to comply
with the international risk-based capital framework of the Basle
Accord capital adequacy guidelines.2 4 Additional catalysts of
foreign asset securitization include economic and legal changes
which will both push financial institutions to become better
capitalized and less leveraged and compel companies to seek
alternative sources of capital. 25
In Japan, the growth of domestic securitization most likely
will not match its rapid growth in the United States. The success
of securitization in the United States occurred through a favor-
able, almost accidental, combination of legal, regulatory, tax, and
accounting conditions. This combination included: lenient
accounting treatment of sales of receivables with recourse,
permission to issue wider types of securities, governmental
promotion (especially in the case of MBS), "regulatory taxes"
imposed on banks and thrifts for deposits, 26 and compliance costs
of maintaining capital.' Japan's financial environment lacks
most, if not all, of these conditions.
Nonetheless, shrinking profitability from traditional lending
induced U.S. banks and thrifts to consider alternative methods of
22 See ASSET SECURITIZATION: INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES (oseph J. Norton & Paul R. Spellman eds., 1991) (discussing
securitization in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western
European countries); SECURITIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE (Patrick
Stewart ed., 1993) discussing securitization in the United States, Canada, the
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan); see also Shenker & Colletta, supra note
1, at 1421-26.
23 See Kawachi, supra note 3, at 590.
24 According to the capital standards of the Basle Accord, banks under-
taking international business must maintain a capital-to-assets ratio of eight
percent. See Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices,
Final International Risk-Based Capital Standards Adopted by the Basle
Committee on Banking Regulations 1988), reprinted in 51 Banking Rep. (BNA)
143, 149 (July 1988); see also Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1414-15, 1421.
's See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1421-23.
26 See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
'7 See SECURITIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE, supra note 22, at 3;
Kawachi, supra note 3, at 590; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1391-92.
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financing, including securitization.28 In the same vein, Japanese
banks will harbor greater demand for the ability to securitize their
loans as their lending profits are squeezed. 29 Banking practices
are likely to be the most important factor in determining the
future growth of securitization in Japan.
2.2. Benefits of Securitization and Demand for an ABS Market in
Japan
Despite the high transaction costs of securitization,30 it
provides numerous benefits to borrowers, investors, financial
intermediaries, and the financial economy as a whole.31 The
most significant advantages of securitizing are: (1) for borrowers,
lower borrowing costs in the form of easier access to credit and
lower interest rates;32 (2) for investors, a wider variety of securi-
ties and the ability to diversify;33 (3) for intermediaries, a lower
cost of funding through diversification, more efficient manage-
ment of interest rate risk, prepayment risk, credit risk, and market
risk,34 as well as better capitalization;35 and (4) for the economy,
a lower cost of capital and a more efficient financial system.36
The benefits to intermediaries are especially important and
28 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1388-92.
2' See discussion infra section 2.2.1.
30 The transaction costs of securitizing assets are high because of the process
of intermediation. That is, the income-producing assets and their associated
risks are unbundled and then allocated to banks and other financial institutions
who are better at bearing or diversifying away the risks. See Kravitt, supra note
1, § 3.01.
31 See generally FRANKEL, supra note 1, % 3.0-5.0 (discussing the positive
effect of securitization on the economy and the financial system, financial
intermediaries, and borrowers and investors); JAMES A. ROSENTHAL& JUAN
M. OCAMPO, SECURrrIZATION OF CREDIT: INSIDE THE NEW TECHNOLOGY
OF FINANCE 12-23 (1988) (discussing the net benefits of securitization).
32 See FRANKEL, supra note 1, % 5.2-5.4; ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra
note 31, at 12-13.
" See FRANKEL, supra note 1, S 5.10.1-5.10.2; ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO,
supra note 31, at 13.
' See FRANKEL, supra note 1, % 2.4.6, 4.34.5; ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO,
supra note 31, at 13-17; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1393-95.
15 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1395-96.
36 Greater efficiency results from the intermediation process, which
allocates interest rate, prepayment, credit, and market risks to the lowest-cost
risk bearers, and provides greater liquidity by using markets rather than
traditionaf lending. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, % 3.1-3.3.5.
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relevant to Japan's current financial industry. In particular, the
potential benefits enjoyed by originators, the generators of
securitizable receivables such as loans, have special import for
Japanese banks. The following sections of this Comment describe
these benefits, their application to the problems and needs of the
Japanese banking industry; and the resulting demand for more
liberalized securitization in Japan.
2.2.1. Restructuring Bad Debt and Enhancing Financial
Ratios
Securitization allows the originator to remove the securitized
assets and associated liabilities from its balance sheet. Cash
received through the disposition of assets37 can be used to pay off
liabilities so that the originator's balance sheet shows fewer assets
and liabilities than it would with a straight debt offering.38 As
a result, the originator will appear financially stronger when
evaluated by various accounting measures, including return on
assets, return on equity, and capital-to-assets ratio.
39
The importance of the ability to remove assets and liabilities
from the balance sheet is twofold. First, with stronger financial
ratios, originators can achieve a lower cost of funding for other
business activities.' Second, securitization makes it easier for
banks to comply with capital requirements such as the Basle
Accord capital adequacy guidelines. 41  Both of these features are
attractive to Japanese banks, especially to those plagued with bad
debt.42 Instead of continuing to resort to write-offs and re-
serves,4 3 banks can recover their credit-creation capacity by
17 From an accounting perspective, the disposition is treated as a sale to a
nonconsolidated entity. See Kenneth P. Morrison, The Securitization Phenome-
non, in SECURrrIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL GuIDE 3, 4-5 (Patrick Stewart
ed., 1993).
3s See id.
39 See generally Walid A. Chammah, An Overview of Securitization, in
ASSET SECURITIZATION 1, 7-11 (oseph J. Norton & Paul R. Spellman eds.,
1991) (reviewing the benefits of securitization).
"' See Kravitt, supra note 1, at 3. For the effect on the cost of capital, see
Chammah, supra note 39, at 12.
41 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1395-96; infra note 48 and
accompanying text.
42 See Poor-performing Loans, supra note 5, at 1.
41 Currently, Japanese banks have only two ways of removing bad loans
from their balance sheets. They can either write them off or sell them to the
19961
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liquidating their nonperforming loans or by liquidating real estate
held as collateral against nonperforming loans." One commenta-
tor notes that Japanese banks are "preparing to shed hundreds of
billions of dollars in bad real estate loans, employing securitization
and individual-asset sales as their primary tools."45
The Japanese Ministry of Finance ("MOF") has acknowledged
securitization as a potential solution to Japanese banks' nonperfor-
ming loans, estimated at $414.16 billion,46 which are mostly
attributed to the decline in the Japanese real estate market.47
The Japanese government also has recognized that securitization
can assist banks in complying with the Basle Accord capital
adequacy guidelines. 4  The MOF has changed some regulations
to help banks comply with Basle Accord capital adequacy
guidelines by easing restrictions on the issuance of convertible
bonds, on the market for subordinated loans, and on the market
for securitized loans.49 Nonetheless, actual transactions involving
Co-operative Credit Purchasing Company ("CCPC"). The banks lend to the
CCPC and must absorb any losses later incurred by the CCPC in disposing of
collateral. See Mitsubishi Bank Securitizes Bad Loans, FIN. REG. REP., July/Aug.
1995.
" Commercial banks, including those in Japan, have already used
securitization techniques to repackage Third World debt. See Andrew C.
Quale, Jr., LDC Debt-Reduction Techniques: Debt/Equity and Debt
Collateralization Transactions- Legal and Accounting Implicationsfor US Banks,
in ASSET SECURITIZATION 388, 412-20 (oseph J. Norton & Paul R. Spellman
eds., 1991); Alfred J. Puchala, Jr., Securitizing Third World Debt, 1989 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 137, 151 n.41 (1989) (discussing an unsuccessful effort by Japanese
banks in 1987 to connect Third World debt to preferred stock). But see David
W. Leebron, First Things First: A Comment on Securitizing Third World Debt,
1989 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 173 (1989) (critiquing these securitization
techniques).
45 How the Bank Cleanup Will Work in Japan, LIQUIDATION ALERT, Jan.
31, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS database.
" See Japanese Panel to Consider Approval of Market for Asset-Backed
Securities, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1995, at A5F [hereinafter Japanese Panel].
41 See Japan Official Suggests Securitization of Property Loans, Dow JONES
INT'L NEWS, Oct. 30, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS PLUS
database (stating that securitization may help jusen, special-purpose companies
often confronted by non-performing housing loans); Japanese Panel, supra note
46, at A5F.
"See Proposals for International Convergence of Capital Measurement and
Capital Standards, Bank for International Settlements, Committee on Banking
Regulations & Supervisory Practices (Dec. 1987), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 530
(1988).
41 See Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee International Capital Adequacy
Standards: Analysis and Implications for the Banking Industry, 10 DICK. J. INT'L
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the securitization of corporate loans remain rare.5"
2.2.2. Alternative Efficient Means of Funding
Asset securitization is an alternative efficient means of funding
because it reduces the originator's cost of funding in several ways.
First, securitization leads to a higher credit rating for the ABS
than the originator itself possesses.5" There are several means of
achieving this benefit. Special purpose vehicles5 2 buy the assets
to be securitized from the originator, pool them, and then issue
the ABS. As a result, an investor buying the ABS looks to the
cash flow from the assets rather than the credit of the originator
to achieve nonrecourse financing.53  Stronger assets can be
separated from weaker assets, allowing the creation of a pool of
higher quality assets upon which financing can be obtainedm
Intermediaries also may provide credit enhancement through
guarantees and collateral.5 5
Second, originators have the flexibility of choosing among
alternative securitization structures. Two examples are the pass-
through structure and the revolving pool structure. Pass-through
structures, which pay principal out to investors when it is
collected on the underlying assets, allow "match funding,"5 6 the
perfect or near-perfect matching of assets with liabilities. This
L. 189, 207-09 (1992) (discussing the implementation of Basle Accord regulations
in Japan); Toby S. Myerson & Andrew E. Feldman, Recent Developments in the
Japanese Financial Markets, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1991 263,
270-77 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 743, 1991).
The MOF also has allowed leasing and credit companies to securitize their
receivables, provided the ABS are issued and sold overseas. See infra note 101
and accompanying text.
50 See discussion infra section 3.3.
51 See Morrison, supra note 37, at 5.
52 Special purpose vehicles also are referred to as special purpose trusts or
special purpose companies. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Structuring and Legal Issues
of Asset Securitization in the United States, in ASSET SECURIIZATION 16, 17
Uoseph J. Norton & Paul R. Spellman eds., 1991).
53 See id. at 17-18.
51 See Kravitt, supra note 1, at 3.
55 See id.
56 As a result of the pass-through structure, "[s]ubstantial increases or
decreases in prepayment behaviour will not cause a mismatch with the asset
funding." Chammah, supra note 39, at 13.
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permits better management of resources.17  Revolving pool
structures, in which a pool's assets regularly turn over, allow the
originator to raise long-term financing with short-term assets.5"
Third, securitization allows originators, especially banks, to
avoid certain legal and regulatory restrictions." For example,
borrowers are not subject to the restrictive financial and opera-
tional covenants imposed by lenders in traditional debt financings.
In the United States, depository institutions have used securitiza-
tion to avoid "regulatory taxes" associated with deposit-taking, 6
as well as some of the costs of maintaining capital in compliance
with regulatory requirements such as minimum capital require-
ments.
61
Finally, securitization shifts the risk of catastrophic loss from
the originator to the investors, so that the originator's potential
loss is limited to its "retained interest, with the investors taking
the risk of loss on the remainder."6 2 Although investors assume
the risk of catastrophic loss on the remainder, credit enhancement
in most rated transactions lowers this risk.63
To realize the beneficial effects discussed above, a Japanese
company seeking an alternative means of raising capital may
consider securitization because it permits the company to finance
its assets or receivables without putting its credit at risk. The
company, in other words, can achieve nonrecourse financing."
In addition, the risks inherent in securitization, such as default and
prepayment risks, can be mitigated through pooling and diversifi-
cation in addition to credit enhancement.65
17 See Kravitt, supra note 1, at 3; Morrison, supra note 37, at 5. The
originator still receives a steady stream of income because it can service the
loans on behalf of the investors. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1392.
" See Morrison, supra note 37, at 5.
59 See id.
' These "regulatory taxes" are deposit insurance premiums and reserve
requirements under the Federal Reserve Board's Regation D. See Reserve
Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 C.F.R. S 204.1-.132 (1991).
61 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1391-92.
62 Morrison, supra note 37, at 5.
63 See id.
6 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1425.
65 See Japan Asset-backed Securities to Aid Corporate Funding: Report, DOW
JONES INT'L NEwS, Feb. 1, 1996, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS PLUS
database [hereinafter Asabi Report] (noting that "statistical analysis can provide
information on the history olbad corporate debts" in order to reduce risk).
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Japanese financing companies which engage in leasing,
automobile financing, and credit card financing are especially good
candidates for securitization because they can sell their receivables
to raise funds instead of relying solely on bank loans with rising
interest rates." Some of these financing companies, however,
may be hesitant to engage in asset-backed securitization because
they do not want to endanger relations with their lenders by
repaying loans with capital derived from issuing ABS.67 Never-
theless, deregulation of the Japanese ABS market likely will
stimulate financing innovations and, in turn, the Japanese capital
market. 8
2.2.3. Better Banking
As an alternative financing tool, securitization will become
more valuable as the Japanese capital market puts a premium on
corporate "de-leveraging," or reduction of liabilities.6  There is
already evidence that Japanese companies are minimizing capital
investment in order to reduce their liabilities.70
The emphasis on de-leveraging is especially relevant to
Japanese banks which, plagued with underperforming loans, have
become more cautious about those corporations to whom they
will extend loans with collateral." The result is a shrinking
market for traditional bank lending. Indeed, there is a continuing
shift away from bank loans toward market securities. Both
investors and companies are turning away from traditional bank
lending because of outdated products and unfavorable interest
66 See Robert Steiner, Japan to Allow Overseas Sales of Asset Bonds, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 19, 1994, at A11.
67 See id. Financing companies also have been reluctant to issue corporate
bonds. One observer explains that "[1]oan growth is so slow now that -banks
want to keep their lending to that industry strong." Id. (quoting Alicia Ogawa,
an analyst with Salomon Brothers Asia Ltd.)
6s See Asahi Report, supra note 65.
69 Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1425. The Japanese Ministry of
Construction has suggested that securitization be used as a method of long-term
financing of public development projects. See id. at 1425 n.288 and accompany-
ing text.
70 See Poor.performing Loans, supra note 5, at 1 (noting that in June 1994,
outstanding loans and discounts by all Japanese banks "posted the first year-on-
year monthly decrease since the end of [World War 11] and have been on the
decline since").
71 See id.
1996]
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rates.72
As leveraging and traditional banking products are further
disfavored, the profitability of Japanese banks is expected to
shrink.73  Shrinking profitability may serve as a powerful
inducement for banks to engage in securitization, as it did for U.S.
banks and thrifts in the 1980s. 4 Although the Japanese regulato-
ry environment is not nearly as conducive to securitization as is
the environment in the United States, 75 the corporate sector's
rising demand for securitization as an alternative financing tool
makes it increasingly important for banks to be able to participate
meaningfully.
2.2.4. Foreign and Domestic Access to the Japanese
Capital Market
Securitization generally permits access to a more diverse
investor population beyond traditional equity markets and third-
party lenders.7 6 For example, investment grade ratings of ABS,
which may have a higher rating than the originator itself,77
permit access to other sources of financing, such as money market
funds, insurance companies, and other investors restricted to
securities of minimal investment grades.78
By granting foreign investors access to its capital market, Japan
could further increase its population of investors. Foreign issuers
of ABS believe that they can maximize the global liquidity of
their securities if given the opportunity to participate in the large
Japanese capital market.79  Nonetheless, the Japanese have
72 See Colin P. A. Jones, Note, Japanese Banking Reform: A Legal Analysis
of Recent Developments, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 387, 406 (1993).
'3 Japanese banks have begun looking to the U.S. market because "the
earnings environment remains severe at home." Ryosuke Harada, Japanese
Banks See Bright Spots in America: Lending Competition Tough But Volume
Grows; Securitization and Derivatives Opening Up, NIKKEI WKLY., Sept. 19,
1994, at 21. Japanese banks have had to pay a premium on commercial paper
because of the increased risk and volatility in the banking industry. See
CapMAC May Securitize Up to $1B in Japanese CP, ASSET SALES REP., Dec. 18,
1995, at 1.
'4 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
s See discussion supra section 2.1.
76 See Morrison, supra note 37, at 5.
r See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
71 See Chammah, supra note 39, at 13; Morrison, supra note 37, at 5.
7" See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1425.
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restricted foreign involvement in its ABS market, a course of
action which has been the subject of contention in trade negotia-
tions between the United States and Japan.8" U.S. representatives
have urged Japanese officials to open up the Japanese domestic
ABS market to promote the "freedom to innovate" in the area of
underwriting.81
Potential ABS issuers and traders in Japan also have much to
gain from allowing domestic investors greater access to their
market.82 Japanese securities regulation, however, has permitted
only finance companies and nonbank securities firms to engage in
the issuing and trading of ABS and similar commodities, and then
only in a limited fashion.83 Although banks may sell portions of
their commercial loans to institutional investors,84 they have
been hesitant to do so. Consequently, true bank loan securitiza-
tions are still far from being a reality.85 As a result, the market
for securitized bank loans has been stymied by restrictions on
issuance, transfers, and trading. Reform and deregulation may
eliminate such restrictions and, in turn, assist banks that stand to
benefit considerably from greater liquidity and marketability in
the domestic market.
3. DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIZATION IN JAPAN
3.1. Trading of US. ABS in Japan
Mortgage-backed securities have been traded in the Japanese
capital market almost since their inception, but those securities are
based predominantly on U.S. assets. One type of U.S. MBS, the
collateralized mortgage obligation ("CMO"), has a significant
80 See Japan/U.S./Financial Services 2: Results by Clinton Visit, CAPrrAL
MARKETS REP., Jan. 21, 1996, available in WESTLAW, CMRFP database;
Treasury Seeking Early Resolution, supra note 6, at 48.
1 Treasury Seeking Early Resolution, supra note 6, at 48. The growth of the
Japanese ABS market would be lucrative for Wall Street investment banks,
which have developed the most expertise in securitization. See Japanese Panel,
supra note 46, at A5F; Steiner, supra note 66, at All.
82 See Miyazawa, supra note 18, at 243.
83 See discussion infra section 3.3.
See Myerson & Feldman, supra note 49, at 270.
85 See discussion infra section 3.3.
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market in Japan.86 In 1990, popular mortgage funds based on
U.S. mortgage-backed certificates also entered the Japanese
market.
87
In September 1990, the MOF approved an ABS backed by
Citibank credit card receivables for trading and distribution in
Japan.88 The approval, given more than a year after the original
request, was rationalized by finding that the "issue was sufficiently
similar to a 'security' and that it could be sold by Japanese
securities houses."89 Even though other U.S. companies have
sought similar offerings in Japan, the MOF has been reluctant to
authorize additional trading of securities backed by U.S. assets.'
3.2. Securitization by Japanese Nonbanks
The first attempt at establishing a domestic securitization
occurred in 1990, when the Japan National Railways Settlement
Corporation financed real estate assets owned by its parent
company, a privatized rail monopoly, with a loan that was
convertible into an interest in real estate assets.91 This structure
was chosen to raise capital without sparking real estate specula-
tion.92
Since then, transactions involving domestic assets have been
limited to the following: (1) securitization of commercial
mortgages,93 (2) the use of commercial paper,9 4 (3) securitization
86 See Henry A. Fernandez, Globalization of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 1987
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 357, 361 (1987). The CMO is divided into several
classes, or "tranches," varying with the maturities of the underlying loans.
Short-term CMO holders are entitled to principal payments and prepayments
before the longer-term CMO holders. See Schill, supra note 7, at 1270. In a
global CMO issue, the first and last tranches usually are sold in the United
States, the middle tranches in Europe, and the ten-year tranch in Japan. See
Fernandez, supra, at 361.
87 See C. Jeffrey Char, Reforming Japan's Securities Markets: The Loss
Compensation Scandal, 10 INT'L TAx & BUS. LAW. 173, 205 n.155 (1993).
Forei gn exchange risk in trading these mortgage funds is completely covered by
hedging in foreign exchange futures. See id.
88 See Myerson & Feldman, supra note 49, at 270-71.
89 Id. at 271.
o See id.
91 See id.; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1425 n.289.
92 See Myerson & Feldman, supra note 49, at 271.
9' See Kanda & Kawachi, supra note 1, at 1.
91 See Litt et al., supra note 1, at 375 (describing the characteristics of
commercial paper).
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of residential mortgage certificates and trusts,9 and (4) bank loan
participations." Dissatisfied with the highly restrictive regulations
at home, Japanese nonbank companies also have issued ABS in the
U.S. and European markets.'
In 1992, Japan enacted the Specified Claims Law ("SCL")
which allowed the limited securitization of leases and credit card
claims beginning in June 1993.98 Under this legislation, Japanese
lease and credit card companies can pool and securitize their
claims under the supervision of the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry ("MITI") and issue ABS with the MOF's
permission.9 It was not until September 1994 that the MOF
authorized the general sale of ABS based on such claims.1° The
MOF required that ABS be sold to non-Japanese investors,
prohibited resale to Japanese banks until after a 90-day lock
period, and banned resale to Japanese investors. 10'
Together, the SCL and the MOF authorization have enabled
the first securitizations of domestic assets. In October 1994,
Nippon Shinpan, a Japanese consumer finance company, issued an
auto-loan-backed security using a revolving structure.'0 2  In
December 1994, Japan Leasing, which leases industrial and
computer equipment, issued notes backed by Japanese equipment
lease receivables in the United States "to enhance liquidity while
diversifying funding." 3 While both transactions were water-
sheds for Japanese companies, the companies sold ABS primarily
s See Miyazawa, supra note 18, at 241-42.
96 See Kanda & Kawachi, supra note 1, at 1. Loan participation is the sale
of portions of large loans. See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 35.
9 See Myerson & Feldman, supra note 49, at 271.
SSee Tokutei Saiken Nado ni Kakaru Jigyo ni Kansuru Horitsu [Specified
Claims Law], Law No. 77 of 1992 [hereinafter Specified Claims Law]. For
details of the law and the securitization structures it contemplates, see Daniel
M. Rossner & Yoshiki Shimada, Japan, in SEcuRzAToN: AN INTERNA-
ONAL GUIDE 15, 17-18 (Patrick Stewart ed., 1993).
See Specified Claims Law, supra note 98.
See Japan to Allow Sale of Asset-Backed Securities, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES, Sept. 19, 1994, at 179.
101 See id.; Steiner, supra note 66, at All (noting that leasing and credit
companies can repackage their receivables through overseas special purpose
companies).
102 See Nippon Shinpan Breaks Through with Japan's First ABS, ASSET SALES
REP., Oct. 31, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter Nippon Shinpan Breaks Through].
103 Laura Lorber, First Japanese Asset-Backed Deal to Debut in U.S. this Week,
BONDWEEK, Dec. 19, 1994, at 1.
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to foreign investors within the confines of the tight resale
prohibition, in accordance with the September 1994 MOF
restrictions.1 °4
3.3. Securitization by Japanese Banks
In 1990, the MOF allowed Japanese banks to sell portions of
corporate loans to institutional investors to help such banks
comply with Basle Accord capital adequacy guidelines.05 The
structure of these transactions, however, resembles loan participa-
tion sales more than true securitization by pooling because the
bank's role as intermediaries is limited to selling portions of
loans.'6
This type of loan participation scheme has been utilized infre-
quently for two reasons."0 First, continuing restrictions make
the loan sales less attractive to institutional investors. For
instance, the loan portions have a minimum principal amount of
100 million yen.108 In addition, investors who have purchased
interests in such loans are prohibited by Japanese securities
regulations from reselling their interests. 9 Second, Japanese
banks are reluctant to alienate their corporate clients.1 Secured
lending laws require banks to provide notice to the debtor before
assigning or transferring the associated instruments.' There-
fore, banks have chosen not to sell off their loans due to their fear
of harming existing relationships.
12
As a result of continuing restrictions in the domestic lending
market, more Japanese banks are securitizing their loans and
1o4 See Japan Leasing to Issue Asset-Backed Bonds in U.S., REUTERS, Dec. 20,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
1 See Myerson & Feldman, supra note 49, at 270.
106 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1426 n.290. Japanese "city
banks" are currently considering a new loan participation scheme whereby
originators would retain their status as creditors and investors would bear the
risk of debtor default. See City Banks Eye New Loan-Securitization Scheme, JUI
PRESS TICKER SERVICE, Nov. 22, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
107 See Myerson & Feldman, supra note 49, at 270.
108 See id.
'o See id.; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1426 n.290.
11 See Myerson & Feldman, supra note 49, at 270.
1 See id.
1 See id. One proposal is to eliminate the requirement of providing notice
to obligors, because such notice is costly and time consuming. See id. at 272.
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issuing long-term securitized products in the United States, which
requires licensure by the U.S. Federal Reserve.1 13  Alternatively,
some Japanese banks operating in the United States have already
securitized a variety of U.S. receivables, including auto, consumer,
mortgage, and leveraged buy-out loans.
114
Japanese banks have made some progress toward offering other
ABS to Japanese investors. In July 1995, Mitsubishi Bank became
the first Japanese bank to issue a security backed by nonperform-
ing assets in Japan." 5 Although cash flows will be generated by
the liquidation of real estate collateral held against bad debts,
11 6
Mitsubishi is required to guarantee seventy percent of the
principal.117  The bonds were placed privately and thus cannot
be traded in the public secondary market."'
In general, the denial of access to a domestic ABS market
constrains the ability of Japanese banks to restructure their loans
and reduces banks' effectiveness as lenders. Moreover, the MOF's
authorization of loan participation sales is woefully inadequate and
has had little impact on banking practices. Although participation
in the U.S. ABS market may offer an alternative, it also poses
additional transaction costs and provides neither the flexibility nor
the liquidity potentially offered by a domestic ABS market.
113 See Harada, supra note 73, at 21. As of September 1994, only three
Japanese banks had units licensed to underwrite corporate bonds and stocks.
See id.
114 See Myerson & Feldman, supra note 49, at 271.
115 See Mitsubishi Bank to Securitize Non-Performing Assets, DOW JONES
NEws SERVICE, July 3, 1995, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS PLUS
database (documenting the offer of Y11.686 billion of zero coupon bonds backed
by real property in Tokyo).
116 See id.
11 See Mitsubishi Bank Securitizes Bad Loans, supra note 43.
Mitsubishi circumvented the disclosure requirement by utilizing the
private placement to institutional investors, primarily comprised of life
insurance companies. See Japan Banks/Loan Securitizations 2: Bonds Privately
Placed, CAPITAL MARKETS REP., Aug. 3, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
CMRFP database. Selling real-property-backed securities to individual investors
may be problematic because of such investors' lack of sophistication in judging
the risks and returns of real estate investment. See Nobuko Hara, Japan Banks
May Get Scant Help from Loan Securitizations, CAPITAL MARKETS REP., Aug.
3, 1995, available in WESTLAW, CMRFP database.
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4. SECURITIES AND BANKING REGULATION AND OTHER
IMPEDIMENTS TO A FULLY DEVELOPED ABS MARKET IN
JAPAN
4.1. The Japanese Version of the Glass-Steagall Act
The Securities and Exchange Law ("SEL") of 1948119 regulates
the Japanese securities industry, including securities firms, stock
exchanges, and securities transactions.120 Both Japanese banks
and securities firms have sought the ability to sell ABS, but
Article 65 of the SEL only allows securities firms to do so.121
Article 65 prohibits banks from participating "in any of the
acts enumerated in each item of Article 2 paragraph 8"2 of the
SEL, which include underwriting and trading securities.'
13
Article 65 also limits the scope of activities which securities firms
can perform. For example, Japanese brokerage houses are barred
from trading bank assets."2 Article 65 has been referred to as
the Japanese version of the Glass-Steagall Act, 1 s which articu-
lates the same prohibitions in the United States.
Although legislative reform in 1992, the "Financial Reform
Law"126 has allowed some crossover between banking and
securities activities, this crossover is limited.12 Under the new
119 See Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 25 of 1948, reprinted in
Japanese Laws Relating to Securities and Exchange & Foreign Securities Dealer, IV
LAW BULL. (series Japan (EHS) MA 51 (1987)) [hereinafter SELl.
120 Article 2 of the SEL contains a list of "securities business activities." Id.
art. 2, 8. Moreover, securities falling within the SEL are subject to disclosure,
antifraud, and insider trading provisions, all of which are intended to protect
investors. See id.
121 See id. art. 65.
'22 Id. art. 65, 1.
12 See id. art. 2, 8.
14 See Japanese Panel, supra note 46, at A5F.
125 Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
126 See Kinyu Seido oyobi Shokentorihiki Seido no Kaikaku no Tame no
Kankei Horitsu no Seibito ni Kansuru Horitsu [Law to Provide for the Reform
of the Financial and Securities Trading Systems], Law No. 87 of 1992
[hereinafter Financial Reform Law].
127 See Alan L. Belier, Recent Developments in the Japanese Capital Markets,
6 INSIGHTS 24, 24 (1992); see also Brian A. Pomper, Note, TheJapanese Financial
Reform of 1993: Will Reform Spark Innovation?, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 525,
556-62 (1995) (although reform may induce some financial innovation,
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law, for example, banks can form subsidiaries that become licensed
securities dealers, but certain activities of the subsidiaries are
limited for a transitional period of time. 2 Consequently, the
continuing Japanese restrictions separate those with the ability to
market and sell ABS, the securities firms, from those with the
greatest need to issue ABS, the banks.
4.2. Turf War Between the MOF and the MITT
There is a jurisdictional turf war between the MOF and the
MITI. On one side, the MIvTI regulates nonbanks such as
manufacturers and retailers. The MITI has helped leasing and
financing companies under its jurisdiction to diversify their
financing sources through securitization to lower their dependence
on traditional bank borrowing and to gain bargaining power when
negotiating loans with banks.
129
On the other side, the MOF represents and regulates financial
institutions, including banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies.130  The MOF has sought to keep securitization
within its jurisdiction by restricting nonbanks from bypassing
banks and securities firms, and from using securitization structures
that are not subject to MOF regulation.' 3' This has resulted in
an ongoing jurisdictional "turf war" between these two entities
which has inhibited structural reform.
132
Another example of the interministry battle is the SCL.133
implementation remains problematic).
1 See Belier, supra note 127, at 24. Notably, the Financial Reform Law
does allow banks to engage directly in private placements. See Financial
Reform Law, supra note 126.
129 See Rossner & Shimada, supra note 98, at 15; Yoshiko Mori, Japan Asset-
Backed Securities Move Signals Opening, REUTERS, Oct. 5, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing the decision to allow leasing and
credit companies to market asset-backed securities abroad). These lease and
credit companies have been proponents of asset securitization.
130 See Kawachi, supra note 3, at 606.
131 See Rossner & Shimada, supra note 98, at 15.
1 See id.; Hideki Kanda, Politics, Formalism, and the Elusive Goal of
Investor Protection: Regulation of Structured Investment Funds in Japan, 12 U.
PA. j. INT'L BUS. L. 569, 580 (1991) (describing the MOF's opposition to the
MITI's initial proposed legislation to regulate the sponsor of commodity future
funds). Politically, each ministry and the industry it regulates form an "insider-
outsider" stance so that both resist regulation from "outside" ministries. See
Kawachi, supra note 3, at 605-06.
133 See Kawachi, supra note 3, at 606.
1996]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa J. Int'l Econ. L.
Under the SCL, the MITI must approve a company's plans to
securitize. At the same time, designated banks and securities firms
that are governed by the MOF are exempt from the licensing
requirements of the SCL.1 4 The SCL also provides tight restric-
tions on transfers and its own investor protection rules to restrict
the market and protect investors not under the MOF's jurisdic-
tion. 3 Although the MOF recently offered to allow companies
to issue ABS domestically through special purpose vehicles, setting
up the special purpose vehicles remains problematic, and so the
MITI has sought further concessions from the MOE136 This
ongoing turf war likely will continue to be a significant impedi-
ment to the development of securitization in Japan.
4.3. SELs Definition of "Security"
Instruments outside the SEL's definition of "security" cannot
be distributed or traded in Japan, except pursuant to restrictions
that significantly limit their marketability and liquidity."' 7 The
problem is that the SEL has a very narrow definition of "securi-
ty."138 This definition excludes trust certificates and other types
134 See id.
115 See id. The interests can be sold in Japan only after 90 days, and even
then only to designated financial institutions. See Nippon Sbinpan Breaks
Through, supra note 102, at 1.
136 See Japan's MIT! To Seek More Finance Liberalization From MOF, CAPI-
TAL MARKETS REP., Apr. 22, 1996, available in WESTLAW, CMFP database.
137 See SEL, supra note 119, art. 2, S 1; see also Kawachi, supra note 3, at
592-93; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1424.
138 Article 2, S 1 of the SEL enumerates rights and instruments that are
defined as "securities":
(1) government debt security; (2) municipal debt security; (3) debt
security issued under a special statute by a corporation; (4) secured or
unsecured debt security issued by a business corporation; (5) stock
issued by a corporation organized under a special statute; (6) stock and
warrant issued by a business corporation; (7) beneficial certificate under
a securities investment trust or loan trust; (8) a promissory note issued
by a corporation for funding its business, as designated by MOF
regulation; (9) security or certificate issued by a foreign government or
corporation that has the characteristics of the security or certificate
listed in (1)-(7) above; (10) a security or certificate issued by a foreign
corporation that represents a beneficiary trust interest or similar
interest in loans by a bank or any other lending institution, as
designated by MOF regulation; and (11) any other security or
certificate designated by cabinet order as necessary to ensure the public
interest or investor protection, with consideration given to its
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of instruments that would be issued in a typical securitization. As
a result, virtually all ABS can neither be distributed by securities
firms nor traded on any securities exchanges in Japan.
As of April 1993, however, the Financial Reform Law
expanded the definition of security to include commercial paper,
certificates of deposit issued outside of Japan, foreign securitized
credit card receivables, and mortgage-backed trust certificates.
139
In spite of this extension, the SEL definition continues to exclude
most ABS, including, notably, securities backed by claims on
Japanese credit cards or leases, even though these were recently
authorized for securitization by the SCLY4'
Even if Japanese issuers manage to fit an ABS within the SEL
definition, public offering requirements limit the amount of
leverage such issues can have. 41  This limitation effectively
precludes the use of special purpose vehicles4 2 in a Japanese
public offering. 43 The narrow SEL definition and the restric-
tion on the use of special purpose vehicles effectively preclude
trust certificates and special purpose debt issuing, two of the main
securitization structures used in the United States.
The continued exclusion of most ABS from the SEL definition
of a security illustrates the jurisdictional war between the MOF
and the MITI because it prevents the MOF from regulating ABS
issued by nonbanks. 144 As a result, both U.S. and Japanese
issuers are denied the liquidity necessary for effective securitiza-
tion.
transferability and other conditions.
Kawachi, supra note 3, at 593 n.37. See generally Hideki Kanda, Yuka Shoken
no Gainen [The Concept of a Security], 152 HOGAKU KYOSHITSU 82 (1993).
"3 See Financial Reform Law, supra note 126; see also Kawachi, supra note
3, at 606-07 (discussing the amendments, including the expansion of "aeemed"
securities); Rossner & Shimada, supra note 98, at 16 (providing an analysis of
the amendments).
' See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
141 See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1424.
142 On special purpose entities, see supra notes 52-54 and accompanying
text.
" See Anti-Monopoly Law of 1947; see also Myerson & Feldman, supra
note 49, at 272; Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1424.
144 See Beller, supra note 127, at 24; Kawachi, supra note 3, at 605-06 n.56.
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4.4. Internal Conflict in the MOF
The SEL authorizes the MOF to designate new financial
instruments as securities.' 45  The MOF, however, has rarely
done so'"6 because such instruments would lie outside the reach
of banks which have considerable clout. Designation of a new
financial product as a security results in a highly politicized
dispute within the MOF between banks, securities firms, and
those who support investor protection.147 Because the MOF has
usually sided with Japanese banks by refusing to designate most
ABS as tradeable securities, this politicized process has slowed the
growth of securitization in Japan.
148
The MOF also may decide not to designate new financial
instruments as securities to respect the MITI's "turf." For
example, the MOF is not expected to exercise its power to
designate new unit interests issued by nonbanks under the SCL as
"securities" because the interests would not be completely within
its own jurisdiction, and because the MITI does not want to
prevent nonbanks from distributing the unit interests they
originate. 49  The unit interests are subject to tight transfer
restrictions, so a securities market likely will not develop outside
the MOF's jurisdiction. 50
4.5. Analysis of Regulatory Impediments
As a result of the SEL's restrictive definition and the inter-
145 The MOF's authority derives from SEL, supra note 119, art. 2(1), 9.
The Financial Reform Law of 1992 expanded the MOF's authority. See SEL,
supra note 119, art. 2(1), 11, art. 2(2), 3.
4 See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market. The Ministry of Finance and
Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 448 (1994).
147 See id. at 44849.
148 See id. One commentator notes that the internal conflict at the MOF
has contributed to the "systemic hollowing" of the economy. Michael Hirsh,
Why Japan Won't Change, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1994, at 37, 38. See
generally David G. Litt, Work in Progress at the Ministry of Finance: Proposals for
Restructuring the Japanese Financial Services Industry, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L.
711, 750-53 (1991) (describing how political conflicts between private parties
have impeded reform in the financial services industry).
149 See David A. Sneider, Recent Developments in Japan's Securities Markets,
in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 1993 345, 385 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 798, 1993).
150 See id. at 385-86.
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ministry and intraministry politics, neither Japanese nor U.S. ABS
issuers can achieve the liquidity necessary for the intermediation
process of securitization.1 51 Structural reform of the Japanese
bureaucracy may or may not mitigate disputes between and
within Japanese ministries."5 2
Given the lobbying by both banks and nonbanks, one
politically feasible alternative is to allow both banks and securities
firms to handle ABS outside the SEL. This alternative, however,
would leave investors without the SEL's protection. 3 On the
other hand, if ABS were included under the SEL definition of
security to protect investors, banks would be precluded from
selling securitized instruments, because the SEL authorizes only
licensed securities firms to trade these instruments.im
Given the SEL's policy of protecting investors and the rising
need for banks to engage in securitization, a third, more palatable
alternative is including banks within the group of entities which
the SEL allows to issue and trade securities. Simultaneously, the
SEL's definition of security should be expanded to include ABS so
as to maintain investor protection. This alternative would
amount to either repealing or amending Article 65, which has
been the subject of much criticism and concern.15 5
4.6. Other Impediments to a Fully Developed ABS Market in Japan
4.6.1. Regulatory Custom
The legal system in the United States ordinarily does not
impose civil or criminal sanctions on entities unless they act in a
manner that is clearly prohibited by positive law.15 6  Thus,
individuals can experiment with new financial techniques unless
such techniques are formally barred. In contrast, regulatory
silence in Japan is interpreted as prohibition, so that new financial
schemes and products must await express regulation or legislation
151 The SEL has been less restrictive with securities backed by foreign assets
but the slow, case-by-case designation process involving the MOF has frustrated
foreign issuers of ABS seeking access to Japan's capita] market. See id. at 390.
152 See discussion infra section 5.1.
153 See Milhaupt, supra note 146, at 44849.
154 See Miyazawa, supra note 18, at 241.
155 See discussion infra section 5.2.
156 See Geoffrey R. Watson, Preface, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 503, 512
(1994).
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authorizing their development. 1 7  As a result, new financial
instruments and markets develop only when regulators give the
green light, which is a rare occurrence.'
This "no-rule-means-prohibition" custom, combined with the
lack of directly applicable law, has discouraged financial innova-
tion, because proponents of securitization must often endure
prohibitively long waiting periods for approval by the bureaucra-
cy.159 For example, an issuance under the SCL requires regulato-
ry oversight by both the MITI, which must approve the structure
of the transaction, and by the MOF, which must approve the
issuance, even if the transaction takes place overseas.1
4.6.2. Legislative Process
The aim of the legislative process in Japan is to reach a
consensus among all of the relevant parties.161  Rulemaking by
consensus has proved to be a tedious process involving much
compromise and negotiation. 62 This process is reflected both
in the SEL amendments, which originally included broad
categories of asset-backed instruments which were deleted because
of objections from the MITI, and in the MITI-sponsored SCL,
which was significantly narrowed by a compromise with the
MOF. 
63
In addition, new rules and legislation, once enacted, rarely face
judicial challenge in Japan."& As a result of the Japanese legisla-
tive process and its binding effect, financial institutions following
the "no-rule-means-prohibition" custom have been discouraged
from creating and marketing new financial products.1 6
157 See Kanda, supra note 132, at 583.
1s9 See Japanese Panel, supra note 46, at A5F (discussing the possibility of the
enactment of laws establishing a market for asset-backed securities).
159 See Kanda, supra note 132, at 583.
160 See Kawachi, supra note 3, at 604; Nippon Shinpan Breaks Through, supra
note 102, at 1 (describing how Goldman Sachs obtained the MOF's approval
for a cross-border transaction more than a year after its original request).
161 See Kawachi, supra note 3, at 608.
162 See id.
163 See id
164 See id. at 607.
165 See id.
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4.6.3. Philosophies in the Japanese Financial Industry
Prevailing attitudes in the Japanese financial industry may
marginally explain the slower growth rate of securitization in
Japan. In the U.S. real estate market, the desire for short-term
profits has been a factor contributing to the growth of MBS with
the same trading features as stocks and bonds.166 In contrast,
Japanese investors view real property as a long-term invest-
ment. 67 Similar investment philosophies may be pervasive with
respect to other securitizable assets.168  Nonetheless, in the
future, Japanese investment philosophies likely will resemble those
of U.S. investors, especially as capital markets become more
globalized.
5. THEORIES FOR REFORM AND DEREGULATION
5.1. Bureaucratic Reform
One possibility for reform of the Japanese market entails a
structural overhaul of the bureaucracy. This suggestion is based
on the theory that the Japanese political infrastructure, rather than
the market, controls economic activity and shapes public policy
through a "government-business consensus."'69  Structural
reform is therefore necessary because a slow-moving bureaucracy
inhibits and encumbers the financial services industry.
This theory is more myth than reality. °70 Observers of the
financial services industry have painted a different picture of
financial regulation, one which is driven by "conflict among
powerful private interests and which is accompanied by a
bureaucracy that mediates these conflicts."171  Powerful private
institutions, particularly securities firms and banks, have exercised
16 See Derek A. Wittner, Japanese Investment in U.S. Real Estate: The
Oriental Express, 17 REAL EST. L.J. 99, 100 (1988).
167 See id.
16 According to one commentator, regulators' resistance to financial
innovations such as ABS has been "anti-intellectual and rooted in nostalgia."
Char, supra note 87, at 205.
169 Litt, supra note 148, at 753.
170 See id.
171 Id.; see also Milhaupt, supra note 146, at 424-25 (noting that recent
commentators have identified private party input as a significant element in
formulation and enforcement of Japanese economic policy).
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their abilities to exact concessions and slow reform."7
Bureaucratic reform may or may not accelerate the growth of
securitization in Japan. A large enough change, however, may
have deleterious effects, such as instability in the financial system
caused by market disturbances or dislocations of established
industries and businesses. 73 On the other hand, gradual reform
of financial regulation within the current political structure
"facilitates agreement among the regulated entities." 74
5.2. Bank Deregulation
A more palatable approach to reform and deregulation is
allowing banks to enter the securities business. 75 This approach
would be accomplished through repeal of the Japanese version of
the Glass-Steagall Act, embodied in Article 65 of the SEL.Y'
Repeal of Article 65 would allow banks to engage in trading of
ABS, the formation of mutual funds, and cross-shareholding. By
engaging in securities activities, banks would be able to diversify
their assets, including both loans and stock-holdings, and allocate
risks more efficiently among borrowers, investors, and other
intermediaries.
The policies underlying Article 65 of the SEL, however,
remain important and should be kept in mind when suggesting
proposals for implementation. These Article 65 policies include
"avoiding conflicts of interest, preventing bank domination of
industry; and ensuring the health of banks."177 Large banks in
Japan have considerable influence over corporations; therefore,
additional regulations may be necessary to ensure that banks'
entry into securities activities does not cause market disturbanc-
es.178 Thus, a more developed ABS market should be achieved
through repeal of Article 65 and through new strategically placed
regulations that embody the policies underlying Article 65.
172 See Litt, supra note 148, at 753.
173 See id. at 743.
174 Id. at 743-44 (noting that the present prohibition on bank subsidiaries
from engaging in retail brokerage is not absolute).
175 See generally id (examining various proposals to include banks in
securities activities).
'76 To date, however, repeal has only been partially successful. See Pomper,
supra note 127, at 557.
177 Litt, supra note 148, at 741.
178 See id.
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One of the concerns underlying Article 65, the health of
banks, has given rise to the criticism that bank deregulation would
harm Japanese large banks in the long-run. It is feared that
securitization will harm banks because: (1) traditional lending
decreases as ABS and commercial paper replace bank loans; (2)
banks' shareholding power decreases as banks sell their customers'
stocks due to less lending to these customers; and (3) banks' big
block shareholding power decreases as securities markets become
more liquid and as institutions diversify their stock holdings. 79
Each of these three perceived securitization threats is discussed in
detail below.
The first such perceived threat is that "as debt securitizes,
commercial paper and bonds replace bank loans, so commercial
banks' influence as lender declines."180 Although in the past
banks were cautious of nonbanks' asset sales because they result
in less loan demand from their clients, Japanese banks now are
supportive of nonbanks' asset sales "because the ABS may provide
an answer to banks' bad loan problems in the long-run, although
banks are not yet allowed to sell them in the market."'
The second threat, declining stock, is not supported by
empirical evidence, which suggests that bank ownership of stock
remained stable during the 1980s.12 Both threats can be mitigat-
ed by banking reform, such as allowing banks to securitize their
loans and trade in ABS. If banks also could act as originators,
they would retain influence as "lenders" servicing securitized loans
and would still retain a credit-based interest to hold stock in their
customers.
183
The third threat, fewer big blocks for banks, is not supported
179 This theory is part of the "evolutionary" argument which states that
securitization, diversification, and fragmentation of stock holdings will erode
big institutional blocks, so that powerful financial institutions in Japan will
eventually resemble U.S. financial institutions. See Mark J. Roe, Some
Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102
YALE L.J. 1927, 1958-62 (1993).
i' Id. at 1959.
1 Yoshiko Mori, No Boom Likely for Japanese Asset-Backed Bonds,
REUTERS, Oct. 25, 1994, available in LEXI, News Library, Curnws File.
182 See Roe, supra note 179, at 1959. A one percent sell-off by banks
between 1977 and 1992 is explained by regulators lowering the maximum bank
holding from five to ten percent of outstanding shares of stock. See id. at 1959-
60 n.94.
18 See id. at 1961.
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by theory.84  Although debt and stock may "disintermediate"
from banks' holdings, they would reappear in the holdings of
another affiliated intermediary that combines mutual funds,
insurance funds, brokerage stock, or pensions.185 In addition,
there is evidence that stock-based power is greater and more
concentrated.186 Nonetheless, because of the current regulatory
regime, banks are restricted in such cross-shareholding; 8 7 thus,
banks might lose their big blocks, especially in the absence of
strong nonbank intermediaries.188 Reform, however, allowing
banks to form and trade mutual funds and develop affiliations
with other intermediaries will help them maintain their status as
big block shareholders. 9 Thus, securitization, if accomplished
through thoughtful reform, is likely to help banks rather than
hurt them.
5.3. Revision of the SEL to Accommodate ABS
The Fundamental Issues Research Group ("FIRG"), a Japanese
advisory subcommittee, has explored the revision of the SEL to
accommodate ABS.1" FIRG has proposed a functional defini-
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 1961 n.100 and accompanying text; see also Jones, supra note
72, at 406 ("'In recent years, the fund raising of large- and medium-size
corporations has shifted from bank loans to the issue ofsecurities.'" (quoting
FINANCIAL SYSTEM RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON A NEW JAPANESE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 12 (Federation of Bankers Associations of Japan trans., 1991))); Gerard
Baker, Ripple Effect of Tokyo's Big Bang, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994 (anticipating
mergers and consolidation in the Japanese brokerage industry).
187 See Mhilhaupt, supra note 146, at 434-40.
188 See Roe, supra note 179, at 1961 (noting that the extent of the
disintegration of big blocks depends on the absence of strong non bank
intermediaries).
189 See id.
190 See KIHON MONDAI KENKYUKAI, KINYU NO SNOKENKA [The
Securitization of Finance] (May 18, 1989), reprinted in KINYu ZAISEI JiO, June
5, 1989 [hereinafter Securitization Report]; SHOKEN TORIHIKI Ni KuKARu
KIHONTEKI SEIDO NO ARIKATA NI TsurrE 34 (May 24, 1991), reprinted in
KINYU ZAISEI JIJo, June 17, 1991, at 68 [hereinafter FIRG Final Report].
FIRG also proposed a new, clearer definition of "public offering," as well as
revisions of the size limits on corporate bond issuance and of the trust and
underwriting system. See id. at 71-72; Securitization Report, supra; see also
Miyazawa, supra note 18, at 255. Also, regulators could eliminate bond registra-
tion rules, which make the sale of a bond impossible once it is bought and
thereby prevent a domestic secondary bond market. See Baker, supra note 186,
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tion of "security" which includes both traditional securities and
new instruments.191 The proposal maintains the current list of
products treated as securities while adding new instruments such
as commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and housing loan trust
certificates to the list to clarify their status.
192
The MOF's concerns about investor protection 193  and
market volatility remain important considerations. In addressing
these issues, FIRG has made several suggestions. First, FIRG
suggests that the SEL should be amended to provide more
protection against unfair and manipulative practices in the direct
sale of securities because originators are likely to sell ABS directly
to investors.1 94  Second, FIRG states that due to the complex
nature of securitization, disclosure provisions of trust law and
securities investment trust law should apply in addition to those
of the SEL.195 Thus, the inclusion of ABS within the domain of
the SEL must be accompanied by additional protection for
investors. These protections include comprehensive disclosure of
the structure of ABS and the legal rights and obligations of the
investors, originator, and asset-manager.
9 6
6. CONCLUSION
There is a pressing need in Japan for a domestic ABS market
for both banks and their corporate clients.'97 For the Japanese
banking industry; the market demand for securitization is huge.
at 23. All of these proposals would greatly help the Japanese bond market.
191 See Securitization Report, supra note 190, at 65-69; FIRG Final Report,
supra note 190, at 34. FIRG has relied on comparisons to U.S. securities laws.
See Securitization Report, supra note 190, at 65-69. For example, the report
borrowed the definition of an "investment contract" from the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293, 298-99 (1946), which defines the term as a "contract, transaction, or scheme
whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to
expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party." Id.
192 See FIRG Final Report, supra note 190, at 34. Under this system, a
security might partially or completely be exempt from SEL requirements if
another regulatory framework with similar investor protection applies.
193 See Mori, supra note 129.
194 See FIRG Final Report, supra note 190, at 4-6.
195 See id.
196 See id. at 9.
197 Japan's nonbanks depend on bank loans for 95% of their funding. See
Mori, supra note 181.
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As both poor performing loans and corporate deleveraging
threaten the profitability of traditional bank lending, Japanese
banks will be inclined to use securitization as an alternative
method of financing because it alleviates bad debt and allocates
risks more efficiently. After opening up an ABS market, "'the
real winner will be the corporate customer,"'198 in terms of a
lower cost of capital.
Securities and banking regulation, the principal reason for
Japanese banks' inability to securitize their loans, needs to be
reexamined and significantly reformed. The government should
repeal the Japanese version of the Glass-Steagall Act, thereby
empowering banks to engage in securitization. In addition, the
SEL's definition of security should be expanded to include ABS,
and antifraud and disclosure requirements should be stepped up to
maintain the policy of protecting investors.
Although continuing developments are promising, it remains
to be seen whether Japanese banks, securities firms, and nonbanks
will overcome the turf wars that have impeded attempts at
deregulation. Nonetheless, gradual reform of financial regulation,
rather than an overhaul of the bureaucracy, is sound both
politically and practically because it "facilitates agreement among
the regulated entities."199 Recognition of the underlying political
process as one driven by conflicting and powerful private interests
is helpful for understanding and suggesting changes in the Japanese
financial services industry.
198 Baker, supra note 186, at 23 (quoting Akira Ogino, managing director
of Nomura Securities).
199 Litt, supra note 148, at 744.
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